During a car sale, for example, a salesperson might offer accessories such as light metal rims or a stereo system at a reduced price, discuss attractive financing or insurance opportunities, and suggest trading in an old car. Other examples include negotiating aspects of employer and employee work contracts and contract procurement.
with specific data about the ongoing negotiation process with the current customer.
During a car sale, for example, a salesperson might offer accessories such as light metal rims or a stereo system at a reduced price, discuss attractive financing or insurance opportunities, and suggest trading in an old car. Other examples include negotiating aspects of employer and employee work contracts and contract procurement.
Salespeople typically initiate adding, removing, or substituting items in a bundle because they have superior domain knowledge about both additional items for the current customer and the products in general. This is how good salespeople enhance the sales process while remaining focused on their sales results. Customers typically have less knowledge about the possibilities and a limited awareness of their needsthat is, limited "active knowledge." Even though customers often value the salespeople's offers, they cannot easily generate all interesting combinations themselves, simply because they don't know what is available.
Thus, successful real-world sales processes combine two techniques that have previously been studied separately. Recommender systems suggest additional products or accessories, offering clients with limited active knowledge recommendations for other products based on their recent choices. Multi-issue negotiation studies negotiating about the price and options in a transaction when both parties have full active knowledge about the product domain, but private preferences. (See the "Bundling and Recommender Systems" and "Integrative Multiissue Negotiation" sidebars for previous work in these fields. ) We automate this interactive sales process using an integrated method that intelligently combines recommendations and negotiations. While interacting, the system gathers data from the interaction with customers or their software agents, and uses this data in the current negotiation and to build aggregate knowledge for future interactions. Our system uses only anonymized data, making the system self-contained and ensuring a high level of customer privacy. We can truly tailor the sales process to the individual customer, thus enhancing the level of personalization. Finally, the sales process is geared toward reaching win-win results, or Pareto optimal outcomes, which are optimal in the sense I n a typical real-life retail setting, the sales process involves salespeople asking customers for their demands and then trying to reaching a deal. Salespeople will often suggest additional products that form an interesting bundle and negotiate with the customer about that bundle's contents and price.
that no party can improve its result without harming the other, and thus no opportunities are left unexplored.
Automated Interactive Sales
Our approach lets shops negotiate with customers about the composition and price of bundles of goods. We model a negotiation as an alternating exchange of offers and counteroffers. Each offer is a proposed outcome or contract, consisting of a bundle of goods and a price. A proposal can be accepted by the other agent or rejected and countered with a counteroffer. Depending on the negotiation process, a shop can recommend (negotiating about) another bundle that it finds through an incremental search for more promising bundles. The customer's counteroffers to the shop's proposals provide the shop with valuable information about the customer's preferences, which it can use to guide the search.
Pareto Efficiency and Gains from Trade
To explain what makes a bundle promising, we make the standard assumption that the customers and the shop can evaluate contracts B undling involves combining two or more items and selling them as one good. 1 This reduces the costs of producing, marketing, and selling products, and more importantly, it stimulates the demand for related goods. Bundles can be composed offline, where the seller decides which combinations of goods to sell at which (reduced) prices by analyzing historical sales data or expert knowledge. Alternatively, such data can be used as input for recommender systems, which assemble bundles online by suggesting additional items known to be popular or otherwise suitable together with a customer's initial selection. Collaborative or cognitive filtering methods can be used to establish the relevant similarities. 2 One drawback of these techniques is that the fixed data sets used are static, making true personalization difficult. Even though these methods capitalize on the aggregate knowledge gathered from interactions with many different customers, two customers who select the same initial item receive exactly the same recommendations. They are treated as identical, even though their preferences might differ significantly.
Another drawback is that recommender systems do not allow for adaptive and personalized pricing schemes for bundles. Some pricing schemes exist, 3 often providing discounts based on the number of products purchased, not on complementary or substituted products. The interactive nature of negotiation offers possibilities for learning about individual customers. In the past, however, researchers haven't exploited this in combination with aggregate knowledge such as that used in recommender systems, but mainly for learning from interactions with single customers.
T he integrative negotiation technique involves investigating ways automated agents can reach agreements. 1 This technique allows the agents to jointly explore the outcome space for mutually satisfying deals. The key idea is that although each agent's individually optimal outcome will generally be unacceptable for another, there will also be many outcomes acceptable for both agents. The agents locate those outcomes by successively proposing concessions. 2 Multi-issue negotiation is especially effective at reaching win-win outcomes because issues with different weights to each of the agents can be traded off against each other. From the salesperson's viewpoint, this lets agents personalize deals for individual customers. Much research has studied the influence on the efficiency and speed of deals reached using various protocols and mediators. 2 Most work, however, has focused on a small number of issues and, more importantly, on linear preferences. 3 For our automated sales process setting, we need to address non linearity because the value of some items will usually depend on whether certain other items are also included.
based on their net monetary value or utility-that is, the agents can express both valuations v and prices p of bundles in comparable monetary terms. The utility of a contract (b, p b ) for a customer c and the shop s are
where v i (b) is agent i's valuation of bundle b and p b is the proposed price. If the shop and the customer trade the bundle for the offered price, they both gain some utility. We defi ne the gains from trade (GFT) as the sum of the shop's and the customer's utilities. This is equivalent to the difference between the customer's and the shop's valuation of the bundle: 1
The price does not infl uence the GFT, although it does infl uence how the GFT are split between the agents as their respective utilities.
To increase the likelihood of offers being accepted, the shop searches for Pareto optimal outcomes, which must involve a bundle with the highest GFT. 2 Thus, the shop will search for such a bundle because it knows its own valuation of bundles and it needs to estimate the customer's valuations to estimate different bundles' GFT and assess which represent Pareto improvements to the bundle currently under negotiation.
Searching Multi-issue Recommendations
The challenge is that the customers' valuations for bundles are not only unknown to the shop, but also nonlinear in their valuations of the individual goods. Moreover, we assume customers have only a passive knowledge about their preferences; they cannot propose alternative bundles, but only value bundles proposed by the shop. The shop uses negotiations with current and past customers to dynamically build up aggregate knowledge about its customers. It uses such aggregate knowledge together with negotiation feedback from the current customer to guide an incremental search process for bundles with progressively higher GFT.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the interactive process starts with the customer selecting an initial bundle and price. The shop calls this the customer's interest bundle. The shop and the customer negotiate about the price for the interest bundle, until the shop decides that reaching a swift deal is unlikely and an alternative bundle should be negotiated about. In each round of the negotiation, the shop estimates the remaining time required to reach a deal in the current negotiation by intersecting its own sequence of planned future concessions with a linear extrapolation of the customer's two most recent offers. The decision to generate a recommendation is stochastic, with a probability that increases in this estimated required time.
We let the shop select recommendations only from the interest bundle's neighborhood B. This set B contains the bundles that differ from the interest bundle in exactly one good. Thus, the shop needs to estimate gains from trade for only a linear number of alternative bundles. Moreover, the customer will perceive the recommendation process as gradual, and recommendations will not appear haphazard.
The selection of a recommendation from the neighborhood B is stochastic. We let DGFT(b, b′) = GFT(b′) − GFT(b) be the difference in GFT between bundles b and b′. For each bundle b′ in B, we use a softmax function to convert DGFT(b, b′) into the probability of b′ being selected as the recommendation.
The recommendation is presented to the customer along with a price determined by the shop's negotiation tactic, and the negotiation process continues. Depending on how enthused the shop is with the customer's counteroffer to the offer containing the recommendation, it desig nates the recommended bundle as the new interest bundle (and thus diverts the search to this new interest bundle's neighborhood) or abandons the recommended bundle and generates a new recommendation from the current interest bundle's neighborhood.
Unlike current passive recommendation methods, our approach embeds recommendations in the negotiation process, enabling the shop to learn about the recommendation's appropriateness for this particular customer. In this way, we can combine aggregate knowledge about the typical customer, learned in interactions with many customers, with customer-specific knowledge learned during the negotiation process. The aggregate knowledge is used to start off the interaction, while negotiation data might override aggregate knowledge-based decisions in favor of adaptations to the individual customer's responses.
Predicting Preferences
With knowledge of its own valuation of the bundles b′ in B, the shop still needs to estimate DGFT(b, b′) for these bundles. To protect customers' privacy, our system uses only anonymized negotiation data to learn from. We use implicit ratings, which are less intrusive to collect than explicit ratings that require customers to fill in forms or score items in ways other than buying or negotiating about them. Implicit ratings are derived from (implicit in) customers' negotiation behavior; they do not require customers to deviate from what they are already doing. Allowing the shop to use negotiation data as ratings is in line with customers' incentives because they benefit from negotiating better prices. (See the sidebar "Learning in Negotiations" for related work.)
Recommender systems predict customer preferences using memory-or model-based methods. 3 Memorybased methods operate on collected data or ratings directly, while modelbased methods use such data to estimate the parameters of a model, which is then used to predict preferences. Memory-based methods are more efficient because they generate predictions without needing to preprocess data, but unlike model-based methods, they don't scale well. For model-based methods, the challenge lies in selecting and estimating the right model, after which they quickly generate predictions.
We assume that bundling will be worthwhile only for subdomains of a shop's catalog containing limited numbers of goods compared to the shop's complete catalog. For example, if a customer is purchasing a camera, a camera bag, tripod, or similar items are relevant accessories to include in a bundle. In general, the range of individual goods the shop will consider when negotiating with its customers will be limited. For such domains, the exponential memory requirements of memory-based methods are not an impediment.
We present a memory-based method we call MeB for this setting. MeB works without a model of the customers' preferences, but it doesn't scale well. Our experiments found that it reaches its limit at 20 items, so for larger subdomains, we developed a model-based method we call MoB.
Memory-Based Method
Our MeB method learns the GFT difference DGFT(b, b′) between all possible bundles b and all bundles b′ in their respective neighborhoods. Right before and after a recommendation, the customer will bid consecutive offers involving a bundle b and the recommended bundle b′, respectively. The shop learns about the customer's valuation of the two bundles by comparing the prices in those offers. Knowing its own valuation, the shop can then compute DGFT(b, b′) for these bundles b and b′. The shop averages these differences for each (b, b′)-pair across all customers who make consecutive bids for these bundles.
Although customers might strategically misrepresent their valuations, we assume this effect on average to be negligible because the consecutive offers are made so close together in time. Moreover, some customers will bid in the (b, b′) order or the (b′, b) order, which further diminishes the effect of strategic misrepresentation. This gives the shop an estimate of the average or typical customer's GFT difference between each such pair. S tudies of learning in multi-issue negotiation generally find that enabling agents to learn about aspects of the opponent increases performance in terms of locating profitable negotiation outcomes and requiring fewer negotiation rounds. In an early example, Dajun Zeng and Katia Sycara use Bayes rule to update beliefs about the opponent's reservation price. 1 Others have proposed methods to learn the opponent's preference function. Scott Buffett and Bruce Spencer used Bayesian classification of an opponent's preferences function. 2 
Experiments
We evaluated our method using simulated customers. We used n = 10 individual goods and replicated each experiment 10 times using different random seeds. In each instance, we first determined the maximum GFT with a brute-force search that let us assess how well the Pareto efficient outcome is approximated.
Customers' valuations of a bundle are the sum of their valuations for the individual goods, plus their valuations for the interactions among all subsets of up to three goods. All these valuations are drawn uniformly at random from the range [0, 250] for individual goods and [−250, 250] for the interaction effects. The customers' initial proposals involve bundles at three random bitflips from the optimal bundle.
We give both the customer and the shop a time-dependent concession tactic, 4 which starts bidding at some distance above (for the shop) or below (for the customer) the agent's valuation and gradually approaches the valuation over time, using a shrinking fraction of the valuation. Each agent has a 2 percent probability of breaking off negotiations in each round.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has addressed this scenario. Therefore, we implemented two benchmarks to compare our MeB and MoB methods. The prior knowledge (PK) benchmark knows the probability distributions underlying customers' valuations, but not specific customers' valuations. This provides a heuristic upper bound for the performance of our methods, indicating what is the most that can be expected from our system once it learns this aggregate knowledge. We provide a lower bound with the random recommendation (RR) benchmark, which generates random recommendations from the interest bundle b's neighborhood. Figure 1 shows the results for our MeB experiment, where relative performance measures the extent to which the methods can reach Pareto optimal outcomes, relative to the GFT of the negotiation's starting bundle b init :
Results
where b final is the bundle under negotiation when the negotiation ends, and max GFT is the maximum GFT across all bundles, which we established for each shop-customer pair separately. Figure 1 shows that the MeB method enables the shop to reach about as many deals as the PK benchmark, in about as few rounds. However, the deals reached are of lower quality in terms of GFT attained. 
Model-Based Method
Using the MoB method, the idea is that the shop estimates a from observing customers' valuations of bundles. If the shop has t observations i = 1, …, t of a particular customer's valuation v i (a vector v) for t bundles b i , then if t is sufficiently large, it can compute a as the least squares solution of a system of linear equations.
We must solve two problemsnamely, that the vector a is typically different for different customers-so we should consider a as a random vector and that the shop does not observe customers' valuations of bundles but rather their bids for those bundles.
Estimating Means and Covariances
Because valuations will normally differ from one customer to the next, we assume each customer to have an individual vector a c governing his or her preferences and the vector a to be a random vector, described by a vector of means m a and a covariance matrix S a giving rise to a multivariate distribution from which the individual customers' vectors a c are assumed to be drawn.
To search Pareto optimal deals with new customers, the shop must estimate m a and S a . If the shop negotiates for a long enough time with customer c, while constantly suggesting alternative bundles, this would yield enough valuations to estimate a c as we described earlier. It would then become straightforward to estimate a's mean m a and covariance matrix S a from data about different customers' preferences.
For a large k, customers will break off negotiations long before reaching the required number of valuations. However, the general idea might be usefully employed to at least partly reveal a c for most customers c (see the online appendix at http://doi. ieeecomputersociety.org /10.1109/ MIS.2011.59 for more details).
Preprocessing
With strategic behavior, the shop observes not the customer's valuations v but only the corresponding bid prices. To estimate valuations from prices, the MoB method takes a model of the customer's strategic behavior, estimates it, and empirically tests whether it is consistent with a customer's bidding behavior. The model assumes the bid price in a given negotiation round consists of a fixed and a variable strategic component. The fixed component specifies the most the customer is willing to pay for the bundle, and the variable component specifies how the customer concedes over time.
The shop makes no recommendations in the first l rounds, so all the customer's bids in those rounds are about the same bundle. These bids can therefore be used to estimate a function g e (t) that models the customer's concession behavior. Over the course of the next d rounds, the shop makes recommendations and uses g e (t) to estimate the customer's valuations. Finally, the shop uses an additional g observations to perform consistency checks. If the estimated model cannot predict these observations, the valuations estimated from this model are discarded. Any remaining estimated valuations are used to estimate a c as we described earlier.
Experiments
The experiments we performed to evaluate the MoB method were set up as before, except we used n = 20 goods, and the customer's initial bundle was located at five bitflips from the optimal bundle. Also, we simulated sequences of 5,000 customers, and we replicated each of those 30 times with different random seeds. Figure 2 shows that the MoB method quickly reaches the performance levels of the PK benchmark. We condensed the learning phase into the first 500 customers. The system obtains large amounts of data from those early customers: about 55 negotiation rounds, and valuations for many different bundles. In a practical application, learning would normally have to be spread out across more customers, and they should be learned from more gradually. Many of the deals that are not reached by the MoB method are in fact not reached in interactions with these initial customers.
O ur experiments show our methods' effectiveness at generating efficient negotiation outcomes. We feel that these first steps have opened up many opportunities for further research in this new and promising area. With the MoB method, we don't go beyond n = 20 because of the brute-force search for the bundle that maximizes GFT. The method can easily handle much larger bundles because the number of para meters it needs to estimate is only polynomial in the number of individual goods.
Note that this method starts out with no prior knowledge about the distribution of its customers' valuations. It learns such preferences quickly, up to point where its performance matches a system that starts out with such prior knowledge (the PK benchmark).
In our experiments, we did not allow customers to adapt the bundle configuration because this would require an ad hoc model of how customers make such decisions. In an actual application, real customers could easily be given this option. With currently available online product review sites and well-prepared customers, this would be appropriate. In our system, the shop would simply shift its estimation of the customer's interest bundle to whichever bundle the customer suggests negotiating about.
Various extensions and alternative methods are possible for the domain problems we report here. Recent related and concurrent work by several of the authors investigates a different trade-off between more effectively search ing multi-issue negotiation proposals and making stronger assumptions about the (higher) level of the customer's active knowledge (the customer's level of rationality). 5 
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